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REVISED ARTICLES 3 AND 4: SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGES IN THE UCC 
by 
Arthur M. Magaldi* 
Ivan Fox** 
one of the principal purposes for the passage of the UCC 
was to make uniform the laws that people involved in business 
transactions would encounter in every state in the Uniteg 
States. A second important purpose of the UCC was to update 
or "fine tune" the common law principles that had existed for 
many years, since some of theserprinciples no longer seemed 
relevant or beneficial in the latter years of the twentieth 
century. Few would dispute the success of the Code in 
achieving the twin objectives of fostering uniformity and 
updating the common law. 
The UCC, now in effect for over a quarter century, has 
also been the subject of study and scrutiny. The American Law 
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws have decided that it is again time to 
update and change laws governing commercial transactions. 
They have revised Articles 3 and 4 of the ucc. Article 3 has 
been renamed simply, "Negotiable Instruments." 
Our will discuss some of the major changes of this 
revision. As of October, 1992, nineteen states have enacted 
the revisions as law. 
Negotiability 
It has been an article of faith that an instrument must 
be issued payable to order or to bearer if it is to be 
classified as a negotiable instrument. 2 The order or bearer 
terminology has frequently been referred to as the magic words 
of negotiability. An instrument which is made payable to 
order or bearer indicates the drawer's or maker's intention 
not to limit payment to the named payee and is therefore one 
of the bases for protecting later holders in due course. The 
traditional rule has held that an instrument not issued 
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payable to order or to bearer which is later transferred to a 
good faith purchaser for value cannot result in the later 
holder becoming a holder in due course. It is well 
established that there can only be a holder in due course of 
a negotiable instrument. A transferee from the payee of a 
non-negotiable instrument is considered merely an assignee of 
the contract rights of the payee who receives no greater 
rights than the payee enjoyed. If the issuer, i.e., the maker 
or drawer, has a defense which can be. asserted against the 
payee, the defense can be asserted later transferees 
of a non-negotiable instrument since such transferees can 
enjoy no greater rights than the original payee. 
Revised Article 3 to a large extent continues to require 
that the traditional ingredients be present in an instrument 
for it to be considered negotiable. A substantial change has 
been made, however, in the requirements for negotiability of 
checks. The revision provides that a check which otherwise 
meets the requirements for negotiability will not be rendered 
non-negotiable because it is not issued payable to order or to 
bearer. 3 The official comments to Section 3-104(c) provide 
the reasons for the change. "Subsection (c) is based on the 
belief that it is good policy to treat checks, which are 
payment instruments, as negotiable instruments whether or not 
they contain the words 'to the order of.' These words are 
almost always pre-printed on the check form. Occasionally, 
the drawer of a check may strike out these words before 
issuing the check. In the past, some credit unions used check 
forms that did not contain the quoted words. Absence of the 
quoted words can easily be overlooked and should not affect 
the rights of holders who pay money or give credit for a check 
without being aware that it is not in the conventional form." 
Based on the official comments to the revised legislation, it 
is clear that the intention of the revision is to protect 
unsuspecting transferees of instruments which would in all 
other respects be considered checks but which lack the "order 
of" terminology. Inasmuch as this is generally pre-printed on 
checks, the revision recognizes the fact that a transferee 
would generally not be examining the instrument for this 
element and could easily overlook the fact that it is missing. 
The exception applies solely to checks and other instruments 
must contain the order or bearer terminology to be considered 
negotiable. 4 
Under the traditional view, if a buyer paid for goods 
with a check which was non-negotiable because the check was 
not issued payable to the order of the payee or to the bearer, 
and payment of the check was stopped because of a breach of 
warranty concerning the goods, a subsequent good faith 
transferee of the check could not be considered a holder in 
due course. If the later holder sued the buyer, the original 
issuer of the check, the holder would be subject to the 
defense of breach of warranty and would be treated as an 
assignee of the original payee-seller's rights. Under Revised 
Section 3-104 (c), the lack of order or bearer terminology 
would not make the instrument non-negotiable, and later 
holders could be protected as holders in due course . 
It should be noted that a bank money order is treated as 
a check even though it bears the words "money order. 115 
Accordingly, the order or bearer terminology is not essential 
for a bank money order to be considered negotiable. 
Particular Fund Doctrine 
The new Article 3 changes the particular fund rule as it 
affects the negotiability of all instruments governed by 
Article 3, i.e., promissory notes, checks, and drafts. It is 
well established that only instruments that contain 
unconditional promises or orders to pay money are considered 
to be negotiable. The traditional rule holds that an 
instrument must be based on the credit of the maker or 
drawer and payment must not be limited or restricted to a 
particular source or fund. 6 An instrument in which the 
promise or order to pay is limited to payment only from a 
particular fund or source is considered to be conditional and 
therefore non-negotiable. For example, an instrument which 
states that it is payable only from the funds in a certain 
account or only from the proceeds from a particular sale is 
non-negotiable. The traditional theory is that, when one 
orders or promises to pay only from a particular fund and from 
no other source, the instrument is inherently conditional 
because if there are not funds available in that particular 
fund then there exists no promise or order to utilize other 
funds. Therefore, the payment is conditioned upon there being 
a sufficient sum to provide payment for the instrument from 
that source alone. 
Revised Section 3-106(b)(ii) provides that a promise or 
order is not made conditional and the instrument rendered non-
negotiable because payment is limited to a particular fund or 
source. "This reverses the result of former Section 3-
105(2)(b). There is no cogent reason why the general credit 
of a legal entity must be pledged to have a negotiable 
instrument. Market forces determine the marketability of 
instruments of this kind. If potential buyers don't want 
promises or orders that are payable only from a particular 
source or fund, they won't take them, but Article 3 should 
apply. 117 
Promises or orders which are subject to express 
conditions or subject to or governed by another writing 
continue to be non-negotiable under the revised Article 3. 
Similarly, if the rights or obligations with respect to the 





Revised Section 3-206 (b) changes the rule concerning 
restrictive indorsements and the manner in which they must be 
treated by those paying an instrument. The revision provides: 
"An indorsement stating a condition to the right of the 
indorsee to receive payment does not affect the right of the 
indorsee to enforce the instrument. A person paying the 
instrument or taking it for value or collection may disregard 
the condition, and the rights and liabilities of that person 
are not affected by whether the condition has been 
Prior to revision, an indorsement on a note, "Pay A l.f A 
delivers 10 bales of hay pursuant to contract", would impose 
on the maker the duty to ascertain whether A in fact delivered 
10 bales of hay before the instrument can safely be paid. The 
revision frees the maker from the duty of ascertaining whether 
the condition had been fulfilled. 
Where the rev1.s1.on is not in effect, conditional 
indorsements on checks make them virtually uncollectible at 
banks since the latter will not want to undertake the risk of 
determining whether the condition has been fulfilled. Revised 
Section 3-206 (b) relieves makers of notes and drawees of 
checks and drafts of the responsibility of determining whether 
conditions contained in indorsements have been fulfilled. 
In the example above, the note could be paid by the maker 
without inquiry into whether the bales of hay had been 
delivered. In the event the note was negotiated by A to a 
· subsequent holder, the subsequent holder's rights are not 
affected by the conditional indorsement, i.e., the subsequent 
holder is entitled to payment irrespective of whether the 
bales of hay had been delivered. The rule that conditional 
indorsements do not prevent further transfer or negotiation of 
an instrument remains unchanged. 
Accord and Satisfaction 
The revised ucc clarifies the rules concerning the 
contract theory of accord and satisfaction in regard to part 
payment checks. Where the amount due on a contract or 
obligation is unliquidated or in dispute and a check is 
tendered marked "paid in full", cashing the check by the 
creditor-payee has typically been held to be a full 
satisfaction of the claim barring further litigation to 
recover any additional sum on that claim. Of course, the 
matter has to be the subject of a legitimate, good faith 
dispute. The perceived difficulty with the accord and 
satisfaction concerns the vulnerability of unsuspecting 
parties, particularly organizations, who unwittingly cash 
checks marked payment in full when the creditor in fact had no 
desire to accept the payment as full and final payment. 
Revised Article 3 continues to hold that there can be no 
accord and satisfaction unless the claim is unliquidated or in 
dispute, the "paid in full" designation is made in good faith, 
and the creditor cashed the check. Revised Section 3-311 
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provides protection to organizations who may unwittingly 
accept full payment checks. Revised Section 1-201(28) defines 
an organization to include virtually any entity other than an 
individual or individual proprietor. If the claimant is an 
organization and before the tender sends a communication that 
full satisfaction instruments are to be sent to a designated 
person or place, a party who wishes to tender a full 
satisfaction instrument must comply. Checks sent to another 
party or part of the organization will be ineffective to 
create an accord and satisfaction despite the fact they are 
cashed by the creditor and bear a conspicuous "paid in full" 
designation. 
An additional protection is accorded organizations which 
do not designate a particular person or location to receive 
checks tendered as full payment. The organization may avoid 
the result of an accord and satisfaction within 90 days of the 
payment of the check by tenjering repayment of the check to 
the party who sought the accord and satisfaction. 8 In the 
event, however, it is demonstrated that the claimant or an 
appropriate agent of the claimant had advance knowledge that 
the check was tendered to create an accord and satisfaction, 
cashing the check fully discharges the obligation and re-
tendering payment within 90 days is ineffective. 9 
Post-Dated Checks 
The rule concerning post-dated checks has also been 
revised. Prior to revision, a post-dated check was considered 
an instrument payable at a future time similar to a time 
draft. Post-dated checks were burdensome to banks which had 
the duty not to pay them before the date stated on the check. 
In light of modern check handling of the huge numbers of 
checks processed daily, the revisors have deemed this to be an 
unreasonable burden. Revised Section 4-401 provides that a 
check may be post-dated, but a bank is not liable for making 
payment on the check before the date stated unless the drawer 
had given the bank prior notice. This notice must inform the 
bank that a post-dated check may be presented for payment and 
advise the bank not to make payment until the stated date. 
The effect of this is to put the depositor under the 
obligation to issue something in the nature of a stop payment 
order. 
Secondary Liability of Indorsers 
The revisors of the ucc have removed a technical 
requirement concerning the responsibility of holders of 
commercial paper who may wish to hold secondary parties 
liable. The traditional rule requires that an instrument be 
presented for payment on the due date to the maker, unless an 
appropriate excuse for non-presentment or delayed presentment 
exists. Failure to properly present on the due date 
discharges the secondary liability of the indorser. This 
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rule, in existence for many years, fails to recognize that 
there is little actual personal presentation of instruments in 
the modern business world. Revised Article 3 eliminates the 
requirement of presenting instruments on the due date in order 
to have the opportunity of holding an indorser liable in the 
event of non-payment. "In the great majority of cases 
presentment and notice of dishonor are waived with respect to 
notes. In most cases a formal demand for payment to the maker 
of the note is not contemplated. Rather, the maker is 
expected to send payment to the holder of the note on the date 
or dates on which payment is due. If payment is not made when 
due, the holder usually makes a demand for payment, but in 
normal case in which presentment is waived, demand 1s 
irrelevant and the holder can proceed against indorsers when 
payment is not received. Under former Article 3, in the small 
minority of cases in which presentment and dishonor were not 
waived with respect to notes, the indorser was discharged from 
liability (former Section 3-502(1) (a)) unless the holder made 
presentment on the exact day the note was due (former Section 
3-503 (1) (c)) and gave notice of dishonor to the indorser 
before midnight of the third business day after dishonor 
(former Section 3-508(2)). These provisions are omitted from 
Article 3 as inconsistent with practice which seldom involves 
face-to-face dealings. 1110 It should be noted that the 
requirement of giving notice of dishonor has been retained, 
but the holder has 30 days to give notice of dishonor to the 
indorser instead of the 3 days previously 
Reporting Forged Drawer's Signature(s) 
Another change concerns the amount of time a customer has 
to report forgeries of the customer's name as the drawer of a 
check. Prior to the revision, a customer that did not report 
a forgery of his/her name as drawer, i.e., a signature 
apparently issuing a check, within 14 days from the receipt of 
a statement showing such a forgery bore the loss for any 
subsequent forgeries by the same wrongdoer. The theory, of 
course, was that the customer's negligence in failing to warn 
the bank contributed to the loss. 
Revised UCC Section 3-406(d) (2) expands the time for the 
customer to alert the bank to 30 days. This change recognizes 
the greater number of checks issued today by all kinds of 
depositors and the practical problems those depositors face in 
reconciling their accounts. In addition, in the event the 
depositor fails to alert the bank in the appropriate period of 
time, the depositor may still not bear the entire loss. The 
revisors have established a standard of comparative negligence 
to be applied in such cases. 12 
The changes in the UCC described above are not of the 
same quantity or magnitude as those contained in the original 
UCC. Nevertheless, the changes are substantial. The revisors 
have continued to modernize and "fine tune" the law for the 
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last portion of the twentieth century and beyond. In general, 
the revisions seem reasonable and based on sound business 
practices. 
FOOTNOTES 
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